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Abstract 
The EU’s administrative systems relies to a considerable extend on the delegation 
of executive tasks to the European Commission, which is in turn controlled in 
this task through a plethora of implementing committees – the so-called 
‘comitology’ system. Considering the centrality of comitology for the 
implementation of EU legislation, the paper addresses the question whether the 
‘big bang enlargement’ of 2004/2007 has had a significant impact on comitology, 
and whether any observable changes to the comitology system can be related to 
the arrival of the new member states. The paper first recalls some of the 
fundamental aspects of the comitology system, distinguishing between formal 
and informal arrangements, and highlighting the major changes which have 
taken place. It then looks at the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargement on the 
comitology system, analysing how implementing committees have been working 
and how the new members are adapting. By way of conclusion, the paper 
examines the main implications of these changes for the system as a whole and 
considers the most important challenges for the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
A revised version of this paper is forthcoming as a chapter in E. Best, T. 
Christiansen and P. Settembri (2008) (eds) The Institutions of the Enlarged European 
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Introduction
1
 
EU legislation is not complete without the implementation of the legislative acts 
that have been adopted by the Council and the Parliament. Implementation 
requires, in many cases, actions at the national level, for example when it comes 
to the transposition of EU directives. However, beyond this decentralised mode 
of implementation, over time the centralised implementation of Community acts 
has also become essential to the functioning of the EU’s administrative system. 
Centralised implementation involves the delegation of powers to the European 
Commission to adopt executive measures, and the supervision of the 
Commission’s use of these powers through committees of Member State 
representatives. The term ‘comitology’ has been coined to describe this system of 
about 250 implementing committees and their interaction with the European 
Commission.  
 
Institutionally speaking, comitology has an oddly hybrid nature, combining the 
intergovernmental dimension of bringing together national representatives, 
comparable to Council working groups, with the supranational character of the 
Commission which is chairing the meetings and ultimately adopting the 
executive measures submitted to the relevant committee. This, together with the 
high volume of decisions taken in this realm (2,500-3,000 executive measures are 
adopted annually),2 gives comitology a special place within the institutional 
structure of the EU. 
 
The question addressed here is whether the ‘big bang enlargement’ of 2004/2007 
has had a significant impact on comitology, and whether any observable changes 
to the comitology system can be related to the arrival of the new Member States.  
As in the Council of Ministers, there had been an expectation among those 
involved that, because of the expansion of membership and the different 
approaches that representatives from the new Member States might bring into 
                                                 
1 Thomas Christiansen  is Professor at Maastricht University and Senior Lecturer at the 
European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA); Manuela Alfé and Sonia Piedrafita are 
Researchers at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht. Previous 
versions of this paper were presented at ARENA in Oslo in May 2007 and at the EU-Consent 
Workshop in Brussels in April 2007. The authors are grateful for the comments received from 
the participants in both seminars.  
2 All reference to figures concerning working of comitology committee can be found in the 
Report prepared yearly by the European Commission : Report of the Commission on the 
working of Committees during 2005, COM(2006)446 fin and SEC(2006)1065.  
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the deliberations, meetings would take longer and agreement might be more 
difficult to reach. In contrast to the Council, however, no explicit provisions were 
made to reform the system in preparation for EU enlargement. On the other 
hand, comitology has in any case developed dynamically over the past decade 
and there have been major reforms to the formal arrangements of the system also 
in the years after the 2004 enlargement. 
 
The paper first recalls some of the fundamental aspects of the comitology system, 
distinguishing between formal and informal arrangements, and highlighting the 
major changes which have taken place. The second section looks at the impact of 
the 2004 enlargement on the comitology system, analysing how the implementing 
committees have been working and how the new members are adapting. This 
analysis is based primarily on a set of 60 structured interviews conducted with 
officials participating in a cross-section of comitology committees, coming from 
both ’old’ and ‘new’ Member States as well as the European Commission. The 
last section examines the main implications of these changes for the overall 
system and the most important challenges for the future. 
 
The Evolution of Comitology: Formal Rules and Informal 
Practices 
In order to examine the main features and issues in comitology, it becomes 
necessary to look into both the formal and the informal arrangements that rule 
the system. The formal arrangements are based on treaty provisions and set out 
in a number of pieces of horizontal legislation, mainly the so-called ‘Comitology 
Decisions’ of 1999 and 2006. Beyond these formal arrangements, the informal 
dimension to comitology has always been very important, as individual 
committees have found distinct ways of working and interacting with the 
Commission and the European Parliament. This section will briefly review the 
main issues in the evolution of the comitology system and the main features of 
the implementing committees in practice. 
 
The genesis of comitology in the 1960s was closely tied to the search for an ad hoc 
solution to the difficulty of regulating the economic and social life of the 
Community while relying exclusively on legislation.3 The need to address 
changing circumstances quickly and effectively led Community legislators to a 
                                                 
3 For a thorough description of the early developments of comitology, see C. F. Bergström (2005). 
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course of action that is well-known at the domestic level: the delegation of 
implementing powers to the executive. Faced with increasing difficulties in the 
legislative process, delegating implementing powers for routine measures to the 
Commission was an attractive solution, but required a degree of administrative 
innovation: implementing powers were delegated to the Commission, but each 
individual legislative act also provided for the supervision of the Commission’s 
use of these powers by committees composed of Member State representatives.   
Even though it occurred outside the letter of the Rome Treaties, the European 
Court of Justice was satisfied when comitology was for the first time tested in the 
Courts: comitology committees did not upset the institutional balance of the 
Community as they were only tasked with providing opinions rather than 
actually taking decisions.4 And the separation between executive and legislative 
powers was maintained as only decisions about non-essential elements of the 
legislation were delegated to the Commission. According to the ECJ, the rights 
and duties of the legislator were not infringed through delegation and 
comitology.  
 
It was on this basis that comitology then developed rapidly through the 1970s 
and 1980s. What was initially a limited solution to problems concerning the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), quickly became a success story in many 
sectors of Community policy-making: before long, many other areas of legislation 
such as environment policy, consumer protection, transport and energy or single 
market regulation also involved delegation of powers and the arrival of 
comitology committees. Indeed, the growth of comitology was such that it 
became an issue as soon as the treaties were being reformed for the first time with 
the Single European Act. The subsequent 1987 Decision,5 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission, provided for the first time a range of systematic procedures which 
the Commission would have to follow in consulting implementing committees.  
With the appearance of the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty, a 
reform of the comitology system was required, in particular in order to address 
the EP’s concerns. It took the form of Council Decision 1999/468, a milestone in 
the evolution of comitology and still the legislative base for the procedures 
governing the relationship between the Commission and implementing 
committees.  
 
                                                 
4 See Case Law C-25/70 Köster (1970) ECR p. 1161. 
5 Decision 87/373/EEC of the Council (1987). 
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The 1999 Decision simplified the system, by reducing the number of procedures 
from seven to four. Under the advisory procedure, Member States vote by simple 
majority and deliver a non-binding opinion. The management procedure is mainly 
used for the implementation of agricultural measures and financial support 
programmes. The Commission may adopt the implementing measure so long as 
there is no qualified majority against the proposal. In case this threshold is met, 
the matter is to be referred to the Council, which has the possibility to adopt a 
different decision. Under the regulatory procedure, measures can only be adopted 
by the Commission if a qualified majority of Member States is in favour. 
Otherwise, the act has to be forwarded to the Council, which may ultimately 
adopt the act. This procedure, used for all implementing measures having a 
‘legislative impact’, especially in the field of health and safety of persons, foresees 
also the possibility for the EP to exercise its right of scrutiny in case of lack of 
positive opinion within the Committee.  
 
The 1999 Decision also increased the role of the European Parliament by granting 
it the right to scrutiny on measures implementing acts adopted under co-decision 
and a more general right of information. Additionally, it improved transparency 
by obliging the Commission to set up a register of comitology committees, to 
publish a list of Committees and, every year, a report on the working of 
comitology committees. Finally, it provided criteria according to which the EU 
legislature was expected to choose the comitology procedure appropriate to a 
given delegation of powers. Following the adoption of the 1999 Decision, the 
Commission adopted the standard rules of procedure (SRP) for the comitology 
committees. These cover most aspects of the preparation and conduct of 
committee, but notably do not mention working languages. 
 
Even though the 1999 Decision represented an important shift in the history of 
comitology, it did not prevent further inter-institutional tensions.6  In the light of 
the limited powers gained under the 1999 decision, the EP pushed for further 
parliamentary involvement in control over the Commission’s delegated powers – 
pressure that increased further when it became evident that the Commission had 
not always respected the EP’s prerogatives.7 In this context, the creation of a 
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive description of the impact of the 1999 Comitology Decision, see C. F. 
Bergström (2005) pp. 264-284 and pp. 320-363. 
7 In April 2005, on the occasion of a Resolution adopted on the basis of its right of scrutiny, the 
EP has asked upon the Commission to publish a list of all cases of not respect of provisions 
concerning transmission of documents to the EP. See, European Parliament Resolution on a 
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European Convention and the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty provided an 
opportunity to address Parliament’s long-standing grievances in the area of 
comitology.  
 
While there were prospects for a fundamental reform of the Treaty, neither EP 
nor Council were concerned with further legislation on comitology. This situation 
changed, however, when the failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty 
appeared to bury parliamentary hopes for an equal status with the Member 
States in controlling of the Commission’s delegated powers. At that point, the EP 
renewed its pressure on Commission and Council via the Lamfalussy process8 - a 
tactic that proved to be very effective in getting the Member States to negotiate 
about expanding the powers of the EP. In late 2005, towards the end of the UK 
Presidency, Coreper set up a Friends of the Presidency Group – a designated 
working group to prepare the Council response to a Commission proposal for a 
new comitology decision that had already been submitted to Council in late 2002. 
With Article 202 being the treaty base of this legislative proposal, a decision on 
this matter required unanimity in Council – another factor that explains why the 
reform of this system is fraught with such difficulty. And yet, despite the two 
years of inactivity after the original proposal had been submitted by the 
Commission, and even though the initial positions among the Member States 
differed quite considerably from one another, negotiations were intense under 
the Austrian Presidency and progressed rather swiftly towards the adoption of a 
new decision in July 2006 (Council Decision 2006/512) that allows Council and 
EP to ultimately reject implementing measures proposed by the Commission, 
beside the standard ‘control’ provided by comitology committees.    
 
As we have seen, the comitology system has developed through a process of 
progressive standardization and increasing openness with respect to its formal 
procedures. However, we can also observe, a closer examination, a high degree of 
informality in its workings, with different practices and traditions present in 
different sectors. A comprehensive understanding of how comitology has 
changed in response to the enlargement of the EU therefore requires a look at 
                                                                                                                                                              
draft Commission decision amending the Annex to Directive 2002/95/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substance in 
electrical and electronic equipment (CMT-2005-151 and CMT-2005-642).  
8 The Lamfalussy process has been used to adopt and implement some acts in the financial 
services sector, and it was characterized by a more structured use of comitology and a major role 
for the European Parliament. See B. Vaccari (2005). 
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both the formal and the informal aspects of the system. this creates the challenge 
of studying not only the way comitology is formally constituted, but also how it 
is practised. We therefore base our analysis not only on the formal and legislative 
provisions, but also on the statistics on the working of comitology committees 
provided by the European Commission and interviews conducted in the 
framework of an empirical research project on comitology9. Statistics have been 
obtained through reports provided yearly by the Commission on the working of 
comitology committees10, and by analyzing documents available on the 
Comitology Register11. The interviews were conducted on a sample of 60 
participants in comitology committee meetings, from the 27 member states and 
from the European Commission. This study covered a number of key sectors - 
agriculture, environment, health and consumer protection, transport and energy, 
taxation and customs, and statistics - which together account for more than the 
90% of the total of implementing committees in the EU. 
 
Looking at the informal arrangements, there is a considerable diversity of 
practices across different sectors and indeed across individual committees. Due 
to the historical evolution of the comitology system much in the actual execution 
of the work of comitology committees differs according the diverse traditions and 
the different needs in different sectors of EU policymaking. Thus, in the area of 
agriculture, committees are more numerous and meetings much more frequent 
than in other sectors, reflecting the longer experience with comitology and the 
                                                 
9 The interviews were conducted on a sample of 60 participants in comitology committee 
meetings, from the 27 member states and from the European Commission over a period of 10 
weeks in the first half of 2007. Interviewees responded to 25 semi-structured questions 
contained in a questionnaire. This study covered a number of key sectors - agriculture, 
environment, health and consumer protection, transport and energy, taxation and customs, and 
statistics – in which more than 90% of  all comitology committees in the EU are active. Our 
thanks go to the respondents of this survey as well as to Jerome Boniface, Gijs-Jan Brandsma, 
Johanna Oettel, Ania Tobur and Beatrice Vaccari for their support in this project. A more 
detailed presentation of the results of this study, together with contributions on other aspects of 
comitology, are forthcoming in Thomas Christiansen and Beatrice Vaccari (2008) (eds) 21st 
Century Comitology: The Role of Implementing Committees in the Wider European Union, Maastricht: 
EIPA (Forthcoming).  
10 See, for instance, European Commission (2006).  
11 The instrument contains a register and repository of documents which relate to the work of 
comitology committees and are transmitted from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and covers transmitted documents since 1 January 2003. It can be consulted at the following 
link: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/regcomito/registre.cfm?CL=en.  
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greater reliance on delegated powers. It is also in this area that the most extensive 
provision for interpretation is being made. 
 
Language has, in fact, been a long-standing and sensitive issue in comitology. As 
already noted, no general statements are made in the standard rules of procedure 
(SRP) concerning language, and the system on the whole relies on each 
committee finding a workable arrangement with respect to both simultaneous 
interpretation during the meetings and the translation of documents before the 
meeting. The ideal scenario from the perspective of national representatives (and 
the EP) - namely to have all official languages available - is generally seen as 
unworkable because of the Commission’s limited resources, the costs involved 
and the additional time that a comprehensive language regime would imply. 
However, the absence of a formal language regime means that these issues need 
to be resolved on a case-by-case basis in the context of individual committees. 
Interpretation is somewhat less contentious than translation. The Commission’s 
working languages, English and French, are most frequently also used in 
comitology committee meetings, and interpretation into the other ‘big’ languages 
and a few of the ‘smaller’ ones is generally seen as sufficient. As in other parts of 
the EU, the secular trend in favour of English as the working language is evident 
also in the world of comitology. Participants in meetings are generally proficient 
in one or more of these languages and therefore do not insist on interpretation 
into all languages.  
 
Matters are different with respect to translation: documents submitted to 
committees tend to be highly technical in nature, and failure to receive these in 
the native languages of national administrations makes internal coordination 
within the Member States difficult, if not impossible. This, together with the short 
time span that committee members have between receiving documents and 
attending the committees (formally at least 14 days but in practice often less), 
means that they often go into meetings without having fully consulted 
domestically on Commission proposals. Committee members can demand from 
the Commission the submission of documents in their own official language, and 
in cases where such demands have not been met, or documents have arrived late, 
the ECJ has ruled against the Commission.12 But there is a general recognition by 
those working within comitology that such requests cannot be generalised 
without the entire system slowing down or collapsing altogether. A practical 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Cases C-465/02 and C-466/02, of 25.10.05: Germany and Denmark vs. 
Commission (‘Feta case’). For a comprehensive description of the case, see A.Türk (2000). 
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arrangement has therefore developed around the understanding that Member 
State representatives only request their respective language versions when this is 
actually necessitated because of the specific nature of a particular measure. 
As we mentioned above, it is impossible to generalise on the number of times a 
committee meets in a particular period, and how many such meetings are 
necessary before the Commission can adopt a proposed measure. On average a 
Committee meets two to three times per year13, but there are significant 
variations: in the agriculture sector many management committees meet on a 
weekly or fortnightly basis, while on the other end of the spectrum some 
committees exist on paper only, without even meeting. 
 
In part, the uncertainty about the duration of comitology procedures originates in 
the practice of the Commission to table draft implementing measures initially 
only as agenda items for an ‘exchange of views’. Such preliminary discussions are 
seen to be required in order to allow the Commission to gather sufficient 
feedback on Member State positions before submitting final drafts to the 
committee ‘for a vote’. The preparatory work done in this way, permitting the 
Commission to fine-tune their proposals before the formal vote in the committee, 
is part of the reason why there have been so few referrals of implementing 
measures to the Council (following a negative, or absence of opinion within the 
committee). In fact, the Commission has been extraordinarily ‘successful’ in 
achieving the necessary majorities at the ‘committee stage’ with only very few 
measures every year being submitted to the ‘supervisory stage’: since 2001, from 
when on annual reports on comitology have been published by the Commission, 
such referrals have amounted to less than one per cent of all executive measures 
adopted by the Commission.14  
 
The Commission’s ability to ‘manage’ the delivery of committee opinions in such 
a manner is also aided by the generally favourable climate that is predominant in 
the proceedings of comitology committees. While the formal procedure of voting 
always remains an option, in practice members of the committees try and adopt 
opinions on as many occasions as possible by consensus.  In the same vein, 
whereas according to the formal arrangements the national representatives’ main 
                                                 
13 According to responses from interviewees and confirmed by a cross-analysis of the documents 
on the Comitology register. 
14 For instance, in 2005 only 11 implementing measures, out of a total of 2654 adopted by the 
Commission, have been sent back to the Council, mainly for absence of opinion within the 
Committee.  
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function is to control the Commission, in practice there is usually a rather 
cooperative spirit between both so that member states’ representatives may be 
seen as ‘assisting’ rather than ‘checking’ the Commission in its implementing 
functions. Some scholars even regard the comitology committees as arenas for 
policy deliberation among national and European officials,15 while others as the 
fusion place for both the national and European administrative systems.16 In any 
case, it shows that the comitology system, as well as the assessment of the impact 
of enlargement, can only be explained if we consider both the formal and 
informal arrangements.  
 
In general, the implementing committees did not witness any formal adaptation 
of their procedures to the arrival of the new members. The formal changes 
introduced by the 2006 Comitology Decision aimed mainly at satisfying the EP’s 
demands for more involvement in comitology, especially in fields governed by 
co-decision. The result has been the introduction of a new comitology procedure, 
the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, that allows Council and EP to ultimately 
reject implementing measures proposed by the Commission, besides the standard 
‘control’ provided by comitology committees. Pressures for reform in terms of 
working methods- such as a new bilateral agreement between the EP and the 
Commission, and modification of the SRP - have likewise been linked to the new 
procedure rather than enlargement. However, some informal changes have taken 
place in the practice of comitology and the next section will look into these.  
 
Implementation Committees in the Enlarged European Union  
The prospect of ten, and eventually 12, new members in the implementing 
committees was initially seen with some concern. The number of members would 
almost double; the newcomers could not count on the same procedural expertise; 
they would bring in a different administrative culture; the debate on the 
language regime would re-emerge, implementation measures would meet 
greater opposition from states usually reluctant to accept further regulation; and 
the traditional channels to reach agreements would not work as before. All this 
could make the decision-making process very difficult to manage increasing the 
concerns about the future legitimacy and efficiency of the system. However, the 
new Member States seem to be adapting to the committees dynamics quite well 
                                                 
15 C. Joerges and J. Neyer (1997). 
16 W. Wessels (1998). 
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and, for the time being, their arrival does not seem either to have brought the 
comitology system to a halt or be creating pressure for future change. 
The following assessment of comitology in practice since enlargement is based on 
the abovementioned interviews conducted with officials participating in 
committees in key sectors, and by also comparing our data with the results of a 
previous research project by Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal17. 
 
The new Member States had been represented as observers in comitology 
committees for several years before accession. The resulting familiarity with both 
the nature of the dossiers under discussion and ‘the way things are done’ in each 
committee helped to prepare them for full membership, and also facilitated a 
process of socialisation with the norms and attitudes governing the interaction 
within the committees. This socialisation process not only contributed to 
familiarise new members with the intricacies of comitology, but also to ensure 
that their representatives would not ‘rock the boat’ once they gained the power of 
the vote.  
 
Indeed, the perception of many interviewees from the old Member States is that 
the role of the representatives from the new Member States has remained similar 
after full membership to that they had played as observers, apart from the formal 
power to vote. They still do not contribute to the debates preceding any vote in 
committee and are usually seen to play only a marginal role in the decision-
making process. This perception is not always shared by the new members 
themselves, many of whom feel that they are more active than the others perceive 
them to be. On the one hand, they think their responsibility has increased after 
full membership and therefore their actual involvement in committee activities. 
On the other, they believe to bring along, new data, a fresh perspective and 
approach to the issues, different state cultures, other national views and a wider 
spectrum of opinions.  
 
The evolution of the role of the new representatives from observers to full 
membership has also depended on other specific factors, quite apart from 
individual experience.  On the one hand, increasing active participation seems to 
depend on the size of the country and its voting power. Most respondents agreed 
                                                 
17 In 1999, Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal conducted a survey involving some 250 participants in 
EU committee meetings. Further details about, and the results of, about this study, which 
included not on members of comitology committees but also of Council Working Groups and of 
Expert Advisory Groups, is published in Egeberg, M., Schaefer, G. F. and Trondal, J. (2003a).  
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that the representatives coming from Poland in particular, and to a lesser extent 
from Hungary and the Czech Republic, are becoming the most active and 
participative. On the other hand, representatives from the new Member States 
seem to be most active in those issues where there is a special national interest at 
stake or in relevant sectors in their respective countries (e.g. in management 
committees in agriculture).  
 
On the whole, however, the new members are perceived, and generally perceive 
themselves, as less proactive and influential in the implementing committees 
than the representatives coming from the old Member States. This can be 
explained not only by the lack of experience and confidence and the need to gain 
the credentials as ‘good members’ of the group but also by the fact that they often 
do not get interpretation facilities. Both factors make participation in the 
comitology committees uneven. In contrast to the Council, no new language 
regime has been developed to accommodate the greater number of official 
languages. In very few cases have comitology committees seen the addition of a 
language of the new Member States to the interpretation or translation scheme, 
with rare exceptions, mostly to provide for Polish. Even if most participants can 
cope with English – which, also due to enlargement, is developing into the 
dominant language of interaction in comitology - the absence of translated 
documents or interpretation in native languages does compromise the effective 
participation of new Member States in a number of ways.  
 
First, even if the representative him- or herself is able to manage well in English, 
circulating draft measures and explanatory documents inside the national 
administration in advance is made difficult or impossible, which in turn seriously 
hampers the co-ordination of national positions and the drafting of instructions 
for those attending the committees. Second, in the meeting itself, active 
participation is made more difficult – psychologically or practically – if 
participants are not able to intervene in their native language. All these language-
related issues are likely to have combined to also limit the impact that the 
representatives of the new Member States have had on decision-making in 
comitology committees, and hence the impact on the system as a whole. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the new members rarely complain about the lack of 
interpretation or translation services, and they usually accept the Commission’s 
justification: translating all draft documents before the meeting into all the 
languages would not only increase massively the costs of meetings, as would the 
provision of 23x23 interpretation facilities. It would also significantly delay the 
process since meetings would take much longer to prepare and the time-lag 
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between proposal of implementing measures and their eventual adoption would 
rise. 
 
In general, the representatives coming from the new Member States are perceived 
as very cooperative with the Commission. Many participants in committee 
meetings from the old Member States believe that the Commission has found a 
good ally in the newcomers and that this makes it actually more difficult to build 
up a potential coalition that would be opposed to the Commission’s proposals. 
The new members indeed have usually a more positive perception of the 
Commission than the representatives from the old Member States. When asked 
how they regard the relations between the Commission and the Member States, 
the new members usually use terms such as cooperative, open, very good, 
respectful, friendly, easy and constructive, whereas the representatives of the old 
Member States consider these relations accommodative and cordial, but also 
imposing, controlling, dominant, hard, difficult, with some tensions and mistrust. 
The general view is that the arrival of the new Member States has not made much 
difference to the way in which decisions are taken, nor indeed to the ability of the 
system to achieve outcomes. The increased number of representatives attending 
the committees has created some significant challenges. In most cases, however, 
measures have been taken to adapt working methods in order to avoid a negative 
impact on the efficiency of the system.  
 
In order to avoid any possible impact on the output of increased membership, the 
Commission is, for example, providing the Member States with more information 
and more in advance.18 There is also an increasing formalisation of the procedures. 
For instance, in some cases the discussion and the voting sections of the meeting 
are now clearly separated, while they were more intertwined previously. In other 
cases, there is no longer any formal table round, and only those representatives 
with objections to the Commission’s proposal are given the floor. In any case, 
those present limit their intervention times much more than before, not only as 
the result of the Commission’s pressure but also out of their own initiative, since 
the sessions have become longer.  
 
                                                 
18 If we likewise compare both questionnaires, in 1999 45% of the respondents said to be getting 
the background information and documentation from the Commission only the day before the 
meeting or even during the meeting, whereas in 2007 the percentage goes down to the 14% and 
the delivery at the very meeting has become rather exceptional.  
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If we compare the results of our questionnaire with those of a similar one carried 
out in 1999, we can also observe that many committees seem to be meeting more 
often during the year. 19 This fact together with increased number of members 
and committees make the bill of the comitology system higher. Fewer meetings 
before adopting a proposal, and more effectively prepared and conducted, 
together with fewer representatives per member state can help to some extent to 
control this trend. 20   
 
Nevertheless the lack of interpretations facilities, implementation measures still 
have to be translated into all the official languages once they have been agreed in 
order to become binding in the Member States. The time between agreement and 
publication (after translation) has considerably increased after enlargement, 
causing some legal gaps and technical difficulties in the national administrations.  
The need to accommodate a greater number of specific concerns seems also to 
have led the Commission to concentrate its negotiating efforts on those 
delegations which are most directly affected by a particular regulation and those 
necessary to achieve the qualified majority. Some national representatives 
interviewed thus considered that the effort to reach consensus has decreased and 
that proposals are being put to the vote more often and earlier, usually as soon as 
the Commission knows it can count on the sufficient support.  
 
Although there seems to be a certain 'symbiosis' in the relationship between the 
Commission and the new members, the latter also seek support from the old 
members. An ‘Eastern’ coalition has not emerged, except in a few specific issues 
where the new Member States happen to share the same interest, such as 
agriculture or structural funds. New members usually join existing groupings of 
countries, whether these are traditional or ad hoc. For them, given the difficulties 
they may still encounter in being proactive, it is much easier to defend their 
national interest by going under the ‘umbrella’ of old Member States. Although 
there are no stable patterns and ‘allies’ vary depending on national interests in 
each specific issue, some ‘collaborations’ are common. For instance, Malta and 
                                                 
19 Comparing the results of the 1999 Questionnaire (Egeberg, M., G. F. Schaefer and J. Trondal 
(2003b) and our 2007 questionnaire, we can observe that the percentage of interviewees 
responding to meet 1 to 3 times a year has decreased whereas those who say to meet 8 or more 
times a year has increased.  
20 According to our empirical research, in 2007 many proposals only take 1 or 2 meetings to be 
adopted, – the second one is usually needed for the Commission to incorporate any 
amendments. 
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Cyprus frequently join the traditional 'Mediterranean alliance' (FR, IT, ES, EL, PT) 
in the agricultural sector. Finally, some special links and collaborative networks 
developed during the accession process between certain old and new Member 
States still remain to some extent (e.g. Romania with Spain, Cyprus and Bulgaria 
with Greece, Poland with Germany, the Baltic states with the Scandinavian 
states). 
 
Some interviewees, especially from the agriculture committees, coincide in the 
observation that France is progressively losing its traditional leadership; 
Germany is seen to be making big efforts to take along the new members so to 
increase its capacity to influence the process; the UK seems to reinforce its role as 
the leader of the liberal positions. In general, the larger countries have lost some 
of their traditional power to broker agreements and an agreement between 
France and Germany is no longer as important for proposals to move ahead. 
Enlargement mainly brought in small countries and it is now easier for them to 
build up a coalition and influence the process against some larger Member States’ 
interests. Coalitions are thus becoming rather volatile and based on short-term 
interests.  
 
The increased number of actors and difficulties, the changing influence capacity 
of the Member States and the tendency to short-term coalitions have 
strengthened the role of the Commission in the decision-making process - 
something which may be considered necessary in order to provide the process 
with some sense of direction and common purpose to ensure its effectiveness.   
Some features of the participation of the new members in the comitology system 
also contribute to explain the limited impact of enlargement on the output. The 
more supportive attitude of the representatives coming from the new members 
towards the Commission, their lack of confidence or procedural experience, their 
level of expertise, the inadequacy of the language regime or the insufficiencies in 
their national coordination systems, all explain the fact that new members are not 
usually blocking dossiers. Some representatives from old Member States even 
believe that, after enlargement, it is much more difficult to form a coalition 
against the Commission’s proposals.  
 
Therefore, looking at the first few years of comitology in the enlarged EU we 
cannot observe major variations in the substantial outcomes. Additionally, much 
of the variations in the procedural legitimacy might be due to the recent 
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Comitology reform rather than enlargement itself.21 However, it is worth 
considering some consequences that the new trends in both the procedures and 
the participation mechanisms might have for the input legitimacy of the system. 
The inclusiveness and representativeness of the process could be affected due to 
factors such as the unequal participation of the new members and their limited 
capacity to influence the decision-making process in comparison with the old 
members. 
 
Furthermore, the increased formalisation and technocratisation of the process 
make debates more technical and less ‘politically’ interesting and deliberative. 
Deliberation usually involves a higher degree of consensus and satisfaction with 
the measures, favouring agreements round the best argument rather than 
trading-off negotiations. Increasing shifting coalitions and more technical 
meetings with less room for personal interaction and debates might also reduce 
the diffuse reciprocity within the committees and the feelings of solidarity and 
mutual understanding among their members. 
 
Better organization and increased transparency from the Commission may help 
the Member States to hold it accountable but it may also affect the inclusiveness 
of the process if there is a lower degree of flexibility when it comes to 
accommodating the different national sensitivities and concerns. Based on our 
research, we observe that quite often the draft proposal is not substantially 
amended, especially when the Commission knows that it has the support of the 
required majority. Many complaints about the system are indeed related to the 
insufficiently accommodative and inclusive efforts by the Commission. At the 
same time, the control that the national representatives may exercise over the 
Commission, and therefore the accountability of the system, could be 
undermined due to both the increasing power and ‘presidential’ style on the part 
                                                 
21 Collective decisions may derive legitimacy both from the inputs and outputs of the system. 
Input-oriented legitimacy refers to the mechanisms or procedures which link the decisions to the 
constituents’ preferences by means of representation, inclusiveness and accountability. The 
extent to which the Commission is held accountable, the process is transparent and 
representative and participation is equal, are all elements of this procedural legitimacy. Output-
oriented legitimacy refers to the success of the system in carrying out its functions, that is, 
whether it is effective or not. See F. W. Scharpf (1999). For a discussion of the impact of the 2006 
reform on the accountability of the comitology system, see G. J. Brandsma (2007) and K. St Clair 
Bradley (2008). 
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of the Commission, and the incentive to search for prior agreements behind the 
scenes in view of the limitations of the committee meetings, given the higher 
incidence of disagreements and diverging preferences among committee 
members. 
 
Conclusions 
As has been observed several times before, also in other contributions to this 
volume, it is still early for final assessment of the impact of enlargement. We have 
identified in this paper a number of issues that need to be raised when trying to 
make such an assessment, and the analysis demonstrates that the majority of 
changes so far have occurred in the informal dimension to comitology, in the way 
in which comitology is practised rather than regulated. The major formal changes 
to the comitology system that have occurred before and after the 2004 
enlargement round – the creation of Standard Rules of Procedures for committees 
in 2001, the establishment of an online comitology register and the introduction 
in 2006 of a new regulatory procedure with scrutiny – cannot be related to 
enlargement. These reforms are best explained in terms of the long-standing 
drive towards achieving greater systematisation and transparency in the system, 
which in turn owes a lot to the pressures from the EP for a greater degree of 
parliamentary scrutiny over comitology proceedings. 
 
Enlargement has had certain effects chiefly with respect to the informal side, 
where working practices, operational procedures and generally the ‘way of doing 
things’ have somewhat changed. However, change here is uneven and difficult to 
generalise beyond the observations we have made above. The ultimate answer to 
the question we raised at the outset is that one cannot speak of any 
transformation of the comitology system in response to the arrival of the 10/12 
new Member States. Instead, it is more appropriate to identify processes of 
mutual adaptation – instances where the comitology system has changed its 
(informal) arrangements to better accommodate the new participants, but also 
aspects which imply new obligations and the need to reform for the 
administrations of the new Member States. In other words, there has been a ‘give 
and take’ on both sides, and the result is a system that so far has changed 
remarkably little, or rather, it has changed significantly but in a direction in 
which it would have changed anyway, even without enlargement as the 
additional impetus. 
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However, it may be too soon to conclude on such a ‘trouble-free’ note for a 
number of reasons. First, even if we have not identified significant changes that 
have yet occurred, we have pointed to a number of pressures for future change, 
for example when it comes to the (lack of a) language regime in comitology. 
Second, there are further changes ahead arising from the treaty reform process 
which has still been ongoing at the time of writing. These expectations for future 
change may yet alter the image we have of the impact of enlargement, and 
should therefore be briefly highlighted. 
 
Raising the language issue, for example, allows an interesting comparison with a 
previous round of enlargement – that of the Mediterranean states joining the EU 
in the mid-1980s. Here the initial pattern was the same – no new languages were 
offered to the new arrivals in comitology committees. While initially this was 
accepted, the tide eventually turned when Spanish representatives demanded 
after a few years that their language be made available. When this was granted, 
other Member States both old (Italy) and new (Portugal) followed suit. Based on 
that experience, there is some pressure for reform building up in the current 
arrangement. Clearly the new Member States are dissatisfied with the lack of 
language resources available to them, and if Poland increased further the 
pressure for the inclusion of its language, other Central and East European 
countries could add their voices to the demand for change. The result would be a 
more costly and cumbersome system, but also one that would make comitology 
procedures more manageable and indeed more legitimate for the administrations 
of the new Member States. 
 
Indeed, these observations make one wonder whether the comparatively smooth 
and unproblematic inclusion of members from the new Member States in 
comitology committees is not so much a reflection of successful adaptation but 
simply a mirror of the incomplete integration of the new Member States in the 
system: given the restrictions of language and time, and the increasing distance 
between those that negotiate in Brussels and those that should be involved in 
national administrations, meaningful domestic coordination is hardly possible 
and thus effective participation of representatives from the new Member States 
unlikely. However, as national administrations catch up and develop the 
required resources, mechanisms and procedures, they could also be expected to 
become more involved in comitology – a development that might rupture the 
permissive consensus that we have observed so far.  
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Beyond these considerations, the comitology system is likely to experience 
further changes in the near future, due to treaty reform process. After the failed 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, a reflection period was followed by the 
launch of a new IGC which agreed, in October 2007, the ‘Reform Treaty’. Just as 
the Constitutional Treaty did, the Reform Treaty contains significant new 
provisions concerning the delegation of powers to the European Commission. 
This includes the distinction between ‘implementing acts’ (to be adopted 
according to the ‘traditional’ comitology procedures, which would however fall 
under co-decision between Council and Parliament) and the new instrument of 
‘delegated acts’ (to be adopted by Commission if no objections are received from 
Council or Parliament). These new treaty provisions would require further 
secondary legislation (as well as new inter-institutional agreements to facilitate 
the relations between Commission, Council and Parliament in detail) in order to 
give these effect. We are therefore looking at the need for yet further reforms, 
either in the shape of a new comitology decision, or indeed a wider regulation of 
administrative governance in the EU, if and when the Treaty is ratified. 
 
Against the background of these potentially quite significant changes in the 
world of comitology, we might expect opportunities and challenges for the 
system to also adapt further to administrative life in a Union of 27 or more 
Member States. The formal changes that are yet to come provide an opportunity 
to also address some of the issues that have arisen, but not yet resolved, in terms 
of the practical working arrangements of comitology. Thus, comitology remains 
an area to watch when it comes to the impact of enlargement. So far, matters have 
been remarkably quiet on this front, but it may turn out to be just the quiet before 
the storm. 
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